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 On the conference organized by Friedrich–Ebert–Stiftung Prague in co-operation with 
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy on November 29, 2007 
 
The Czech Republic behind the Steering Wheel of the European Union 
Strategic issues of the EU Presidency in 2009 
 
 
Programme and participants 
 
 
Keynote speech: The Impact of the Reform Treaty institutional changes on the Czech EU 
Presidency 
 
• Alexandr Vondra, Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs of the Czech Republic's 
Government 
 
Panel I: Crucial Factors of a successful EU Presidency – Lessons learned 
 
• Daniela Kietz, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
• Matej Marn, Head of EU Department,  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Slovenia  
• Ole Toft, Head of the EU policy department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark  
  
 
Panel II: The main political challenges for the Team Presidency 2008-2009 
 
• Jerome Creel, OFCE (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) 
• Lukáš Pachta, EUROPEUM 






The Czech Presidency (in the first half of 2009) is going to be influenced by the 
implementation of the changes the Reform (Lisbon) Treaty envisages in the institutional field. 
Alexandr Vondra opened the event with remark that the Czech government is going to be 
prepared for all scenarios, which can arise in connection to the ratification process and the 
date the Treaty comes into effect; the strategic considerations are under way as well as the 
operational preparations.  
 
Overall, the circumstances are not favourable for the performance of the first Czech 
Presidency; there are five reasons why it will be a difficult task:  
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• First, European Parliament (EP) elections are taking place in June 2009, influencing 
the legislative effectiveness of the body – two scenarios: EP ineffective roughly since 
February 2009 (rather optimistic) or already since the end of 2008 (pessimistic but 
likely scenario, based on the informal talks with MEPs). The room for manoeuvre in 
legislative sense will be thus limited for the Czech Presidency. The EP elections will 
also contribute to a heated atmosphere both, in the EU as such, and in the Czech 
Republic’s domestic politics in particular. In the countries holding the EU Presidency 
a political ceasefire is usually concluded for given 6 month period. In case of the 
Czech Republic it can prove difficult due the last general elections results and post-
elections development.  
 
• Second, also the European Commission’s term in office is going to end during the 
Czech Presidency; the Commissioners will split into two groups: those aspiring for re-
nomination (with a limited will to promote any reform steps at given time) and those 
leaving the Commission for good (some of them striving to return to their domestic 
political life and thus ready to support particular interests of a Member State).  
 
• Third, the date the Reform Treaty enters into effect (consequences in terms of 
implementation of the new institutional provisions – namely investiture of the 
Permanent President of the European Council and newly defined High Representative 
for CFSP). It is an external variable, which depends on ratification process in all 27 
Member States. There is a will to avoid the problems (the referendum will take place 
only in Ireland); however the situation can get complicated elsewhere (the 
Netherlands) or the ratification can get delayed (Constitutional Court examination).  
 
• Fourth, Reform (Lisbon) Treaty comes into effect as planned, bringing up the issue of 
“transformation/implementation period” entailing not only the discussion on 
investiture process and particular names but also the (still) unresolved “code of 
conduct” under which the new institutional structure will operate.  
 
• Lastly, the “unknown unknowns” entering the process and influencing (dominating) 
the Presidency implementation; the only thing, which can be taken for granted is the 
factor of uncertainty and the need to be prepared for all possible developments. There 
are two ways how the uncertainty can be approached – as a burden or as a challenge, 
and the Czech Government is going to address it as a challenge. It will be a test of 
flexibility and realism (realistic approach), of maturity of the Czech politics, 
diplomacy and bureaucracy; and if completed successfully, the Czech Republic’s 
position in the EU will be strengthened. 
 
 
4 scenarios regarding the Reform (Lisbon) Treaty:  
 
• Treaty in effect as of January 1
st
 2009 (as planned) 
• Treaty in effect during the spring 2009 
• Treaty ratification significantly delayed, no implementation overlaps with the Czech 
Presidency 
• Treaty not ratified 
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It is evident, that the major impact on the Czech Presidency would have the first scenario. 
Due the envisaged institutional changes, the Presidency would be more inwards-oriented. 
Four elements have to be mentioned when this scenario applies. First, the Presidency will not 
chair the formal and informal European Councils, which leads to the question of the tasks and 
position of the (Czech, and future Presidencies as well) Prime Minister; this issue is serious 
since it is closely intertwined with the motivation and sense of ownership on the side of the 
heads of states and governments. To motivate the top national politicians is crucial for a 
successful Presidency as well as the tangible political pay-offs they can see. Functioning 
model (new rules of the game) of the “cohabitation” of the Presidency and the Permanent 
President of the European Council must be found. Second, the nomination of the High 
Representative for CFSP (not so politically sensitive) will leave the Presidency without an 
influence over the EU external relations and it will be an interesting issue in terms of the 
Member States´ internal politics, too. Third, the Czech Presidency will focus more on the EU 
internal policies, trying to influence the legislation–making, if the EP is fully operational at 
least for some time. It is envisaged there will be rather a room for initiating a conceptual work 
(green and white papers) in combination with reflecting and balancing the achieved state of 
affairs; the year 2009 will mark 20 years anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall and 5 years 
after the 2004 enlargement – the Czechs have already agreed with the European Commission 
to issue jointly a study “5 years after”, which would underline the benefits of the enlargement. 
Fourth, representation of the Council towards the other EU institutions and implementation 
of the institutional changes in relations to them (the organisational and administrative 
preparations are also a priority of the French Presidency).  
 
The second scenario – ratification stumbles elsewhere. It is questionable, whether the Czech 
Republic’s influence over the nomination policy (new posts) would thus increase. Czech 
Presidency could face “specific legislation-making strategies” of some countries, which could 
start delaying or speeding up the process.  
 
The third scenario – longer delay in ratification or a deal to start with the new institutional 
provisions after the EP elections; in this case, the Czech Presidency would be “full-fledged” 
in current terms and would have to negotiate the investiture to the new posts, to certain extent. 
The role of the Presidency in the EU external relations would remain intact.  
 
The fourth scenario – the consequences of non-ratification are not clear, yet, but the 
Presidency’s role as a broker or moderator of the reflection process would be a priority. The 
Czech Presidency would also strive to prevent the unfavourable developments (not in Czech 




Preparations in Trio – the work on the 18-month programme already represents a 
compromise and, to certain extent, mirrors the issues EU is able to agree on. The 3 
governments have much in common; a reform drive and an aim to increase competitiveness 
vis á vis China and India. However, the three countries put different accents on certain issues 
as well (attitudes to CAP for example).  
 
Political realism is a value added, to adopt strictly and ideological approach is 
counterproductive in the EU. The ideological debate is taking place but not at the expense of 
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reaching a compromise. Looking at the developments in the ODS itself, the recent party 
congress showed the political realism is the only way forward; it is an important asset.  
 
Value added of the Czech Presidency – accomplishment of four freedoms, further 
enlargement and more active approach towards the neighbourhood (slogan “Europe without 
barriers”). Good transatlantic relations must be maintained and more coherent policy towards 
Russia would be a goal as well. Energy policy is of key importance to the Czech Presidency – 
the European Commission already prepared the third energy package, which should be 
mirrored in the concrete policy steps in 2008/2009.   
 
Transatlantic bargain during the Czech Presidency – stress on keeping strong NATO; if 
the outcome of the bargain would be stronger Europe and NATO it would add new quality 
and dimension to the transatlantic cooperation; also the economic link, revived by the German 
Presidency, is very important.  
 
 
Panel I  
 
By way of introduction, Daniela Kietz gave an overview of the functions and tasks, which 
must be completed, as well as of limitations and restrictions any EU Presidency works under 
and why there is usually much smaller room for manoeuvre than generally perceived.  
 
Roles and functions of the EU Presidency: 
 
• Management of the day to day business of the EU Council – scheduling, chairing 
and coordination of up to 4.000 meetings at the working levels, coordination of the 
negotiations with the European Parliament; 
 
• Brokerage – perceived as a most important role, Presidency as a mediator of a 
compromise in the negotiations within Council, with the EP and also in relations to the 
third countries (summing up all positions and look for a compromise and bargains); 
 
• Political leadership (strategic guidance) – Presidency has to put the actual 
negotiations to the wider perspective of the future challenges for the EU, moving away 
from frictions and recasting the debate in the long term perspective; 
 
• Initiating new projects – most of the presidencies want to leave a fingerprint on the 
EU agenda, bringing up two or three long term projects. 
 
Restrictions and constrains the Presidency works under: 
 
• Limited room for bringing up Presidency’s own projects or policy goals (especially 
the public and the media are not aware of this fact); the Presidency rather implements 
the existing and planned EU agenda (and the external crisis can occur);  
 
• New projects can be either initiated or a project started by the predecessor completed, 
in given six month; it is a period too short for extensive concept work; 
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• Presidency has a central role in the institutional system, however, it is just one of 
many actors involved (EP, the national delegations, the third countries, etc.). 
 
To conclude, the Presidency is not that almighty as it might seem, and very often the national 
public and media expectations are much higher than what can be achieved in reality. 
 
Overview of the factors, which made the German Presidency successful:  
 
• Starting preparations as early as possible – important programme-wise and in terms 
of priorities selection; realistic time planning (time schedule) of the meetings in the 
EU institutions and negotiation processes in the single dossiers is crucial (especially 
for other (small) MS it takes longer to build their negotiation position); important also 
in terms of building strategies and coalitions beforehand (when the Presidency starts, 
it is to late to start mapping the “Presidency friendly” coalitions for given dossiers). 
Smaller countries tend to rely more on cooperation with the Council Secretariat and 
the European Commission (and EP), necessary to develop good relations.   
 
• Brokerage – it is important to create a sense of ownership within the Presidency team 
(political elites), lot of effort must be put into achieving the goals and all actors must 
be dedicated and involved in this process (right attitude of the PM, ministers, civil 
servants). Personalities (and their attitude) matter (in relation to this, the investiture of 
the Permanent President of the European Council can damage the initiatives coming 
from the offices of heads of states). Neutrality, fairness and credibility as the 
fundamental factors of a successful broker; need to tame the national interests.   
 
• Unity of the national standpoint – no disaccord among the national line ministries, 
which would limit the capability of the Presidency to act at the EU level, can occur. 
 
• Strategies of action when the national interest of the Presidency is too strong – to 
build a coalition of likeminded Member States representing the interest of the 
Presidency without its direct involvement. Cooperation with the Commission (and the 
EP) in advance in order to bring Presidency ideas through the Commission in. Frame 
the new project as an EU interest and to cooperate with the preceding Presidencies.   
 
• Informality and large number of bilateral and multilateral meetings – informal 
consultations between the ministers (and high level civil servants) and their EU 
counterparts before the German Presidency started; factor of resources (usually, the 
Presidencies of smaller Member States tend to be better because the have limited 
national interest and it is easier for them to coordinate their national level but a small 
country cannot effectively carry out so many bilateral meetings).       
 
• Consultations with EU institutions – not to ignore European Parliament and the 
European Commission (change of the German Presidency strategy towards the EP 
when negotiating on Justice and Home Affairs issues).   
 
• Inclusiveness – especially important for the big Member States to get the smaller ones 
on the board (also within QMV). 
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The speaker concluded with the remark on the Trio Presidency – the results of the first Trio 
(Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia) analysis are rather disappointing. The differences between 
having two Presidencies cooperating closely and a Trio Presidency do not seem to be 
significant. The consultation of the programming took place but in terms of cooperation on 
the implementation, the results are rather limited (especially in CFSP and ENP fields). In 
terms of coherence, the cooperation in Trio did not bring much improvement.   
 
 
Ole Toft presented a high civil servant view on running a Presidency; it is a huge task with a 
tremendous workload (also during the month leading to the Presidency) requiring a lot of 
effort and financial resources but the pay-offs are also enormous, not only in political terms 
(presentation of the country, appeal to the domestic public); Presidency also creates a 
knowledge and expertise within the national public administration.  
 
An informal tradition of “parliamentary truth” among the political parties has developed in 
Denmark; the opposition is well informed about the government’s steps during the Presidency 
(regular coordination meetings).  
 
Framework conditions for a Presidency (need to be taken into account when planning the 
Presidency): 
 
• Agenda-setting role – mostly the inherited agenda, including the high level meetings 
(in Danish case – 90% was inherited, only 5% can be labelled a Danish Presidency 
initiative (in 2002) – usually connected to the geographical factors). 
 
• Structural preconditions – for the Czech Presidency, the EP elections, end of 
European Commission’s term in office and Lisbon Treaty ratification are crucial. 
 
• Unforeseen events – energy supply crisis or a terrorist attack; need to prepare 
mentally and create response structure within the public administration in advance.  
 
Characteristics of a successful Presidency:  
 
• Ability to solve given tasks and move the projects further; necessary to set the 
direction and stick to it so that the procedure is transparent for the partners.  
 
• To be perceived as an honest broker, handling the issues of national interest by an 
indirect approach.  
 
• Managing the risk of loosing a focus, especially during the last two month.  
 
 
Two crucial conditions for a successful Presidency:  
 
• Extensive preparations 
 
• Creation of an effective and flexible organisation of the Presidency, allowing for fast 
and efficient response 
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Lessons learned from the 2002 Danish EU Presidency: 
 
• Enthusiasm as a prerequisite for a good Presidency, creating an energy moving things 
forward. 
 
• Clear chain of command and communication within the Presidency has to be 
established so that no time is spent on coordination at the national level; it requires 
political ownership and good organisation. 
 
• Cooperation between the capital and the Permanent representation in Brussels 
must function perfectly; it is a crucial element (during the Danish Presidency, 
strategic decisions were taken in the capital and operational decisions in Brussels so 
that the people there could act at in a real time). 
 
• Good working relations with the Council and the European Commission; it is also 
important to liaise in advance with key MEPs; personal relations are important. 
 
• Media – need to coordinate the positions of the parts of the system (specifically 
Brussels and the capital) so that the media get the same message (also a good website 
of the Presidency is needed – it serves as a main tool for many journalists).  
 
 
Matej Marn elaborated on state of preparations in Slovenia (first half of 2008).  
 
• Cooperation with the European Commission and Council Secretariat is very 
important; Slovenian Presidency counts on several papers and dossiers Commission is 
to publish during the upcoming six months.  
 
• Preparations started already in 2005, when the decision on future EU Presidencies 
was taken. Slovenia is the first “new” (and Slavic) Member State to preside, 
interesting geo–strategic position. 
 
• Work in Trio – it was a good exercise because all line ministries were heavily 
involved in the preparations of the joint programme (starting already in 2006); also the 
following French Presidency is important since France will represent Slovenia in 
many countries in the world (also a cooperation on the calendar of meetings due the 
planning on yearly basis)    
 
• Issue of human resources – Slovenia as a small country (2.000 civil servants needed 
for running the work of the Council). 
 
• Model of Brussels–based Presidency, with the strategic decisions taken in Ljubljana 
and the operational decisions in Brussels.  
 
• Centralized organizational structure – 5 sub-working groups preparing the 
Presidency: Group on programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Human resources 
group, PR and Communication Group (responsible for logo and communication), 
Secretariat of the Presidency (logistics of the events in Slovenia), Group on budget 
(estimated costs € 62 million); PM’s office is the highest decision-making body, 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for CFSP and Government office for 
European Affairs, attached to the PM’s office, runs I and III pillar coordination. 
 
• Priorities – ratification and implementation process of the Reform (Lisbon) Treaty, 
the Western Balkans and Kosovo issue, Lisbon strategy, climate change. 
 
• Issues coming up during the Presidency (besides the Reform (Lisbon) Treaty 
ratification) – establishment of a wise men group (French idea) – how will the EU 
look after 2020, revision of the European Security Strategy (mandate has not been set, 




Objective criteria of a successful Presidency – hard to elaborate (different views from 
Brussels and from the national capitals), national ministries usually evaluate their 
performance and also independent think-tanks carry out this task but doing it simply by taking 
the Presidency’s goals and assess whether they were achieved is not realistic since many 
external factors can influence the Presidency. It is necessary to look at every dossier and 
evaluate everything – brokerage, management as well as all constraints coming into play.  
 
How a right image can be created (of the country holding the Presidency and of the EU) – 
to set the clear goals; involvement of the public is important – information and awareness 
raising policy on the Presidency goals and priorities; promotion of culture of given Presidency 
country elsewhere (Presidency as a selling factor).   
 
How can the Presidency influence the working programme of the Commission – need to 
be in contact with the Commission at a very early stage. Due the enlargement, it is more then 
ever necessary to work outside the meeting rooms of the Council. The Commission is also 
changing its working rules and it is important to be in a constant dialogue with her (in a pro-
active way and also at technical level). It is much easier to seek the support in advance than 
later on, when the proposal is already drafted and tabled (Very often, one of the worst 
problems of a Presidency is that it cannot get the papers it expected from the Commission).    
 
Roles of the MEPs in preparing the Presidency – they are active but it differs country by 
country; in Slovenia, the MEPs tested what the EP things about different issues Slovenia is 






The main issues of the Franco-Czech-Swedish Trio Presidency were discussed, especially the 
intertwined issues of the CAP reform, and revision (and reform) of the EU financial 
perspective, as well as Trio Presidency priority overlaps. 
 
Jerome Creel opened the panel with remarks on the French position; after the presidential 
elections, new discourse of “France is being back in Europe” emerged. 
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At the moment, there are numerous (7) priorities of the French Presidency, in hierarchical 
order as follows: 
 
• Migration – aim to foster a European pact on global and coordinated management of 
migration, selective approach to the immigrants as a principle. 
• Energy – preserving France’s supplies safety and to encourage the development 
towards use of nuclear energy and development.  
• Environmental issues – sustainable development and promotion of equal taxes and 
emission permits, to reduce the greenhouse gases emission, post–Kyoto. 
• Defence – more expenditure and Mediterranean Union project 
• CAP – re-examination of spending and policy as such (position: we need CAP but a 
reformed one with more control on crediting, able to enhance environment protection) 
• Growth and employment – continuing the Lisbon strategy 
• External relations (rest of the world) – intellectual property rights protection, fight 
against poverty and development policy 
 
Ambitious agenda; conditional success depending on the capacity of the French authorities to 
overcome the differences over CAP – two main issues are related: the disputes over the costs 
of CAP within the EU and secondly, the international dimension (WTO); a thorough analysis 
of the third countries production and specializations should be done. 
 
Future of the CAP 
 
• Doha agreement is fostering competition – a positive trend for the European 
consumers; problem of the last European Commission Communication (advocating 
gradual elimination of milk quotas, suppression of supply limitations, etc.) – the 
Commission tries to foster supply in order to reduce prices but it can turn ineffective 
on the long run when being implemented. Opposition of France towards 
Commission’s position. French position – CAP must be preserved because public 
intervention is legitimate (against dumping), and market failures and externalities 
occur. Commission’s position – other model of risk management (against dumping) – 
taxes or indirect payments and decoupling. 
 
 
Lukáš Pachta elaborated on the Czech Presidency priorities; there are two types of priorities: 
given by the context and time frame, and selected by the Presidency. 
 
• Liberalization agenda, which goes against the French motto (Protection Europe). To 
evaluate it critically, the Czech Presidency will be probably not able to go beyond the 
issue of free movement of persons (and labour). There will be no room for starting 
other initiatives (further efforts towards liberalization of the services, for example, or 
the trade policy, complicated by the CAP reform). 
 
• Energy policy – joint priority of the Trio, convergence of the positions on nuclear 
energy (with France, with Sweden to lesser extent); question of credibility of the 
Czech Presidency (the issue is closely linked with the topics like alternative energy 
resources and climate change and the extreme position of the Czech president Vaclav 
Klaus on these issues can harm the credibility as well as government’s position on 
“unbundling”, which was in line with the interests of CEZ company).   
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• External relations– the official document on the Presidency priorities uses a heading 
“Europe as a global partner”, not actor or player, which suggests the Czech 
government’s attitude to CFSP is rather sceptical.  
 
• Budget reform (priority given by the context): two separate issues – first, health 
check of the current Financial Perspective (2007-2013), i.e. mainly the revision of the 
current expenses (CAP expenses, as a part of the 2003 CAP reform). The French 
Presidency will strive to conclude this part during its six month. Second, the debate on 
the budget reform after 2013 (condition of the 2005 agreement on the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013); debate on the structure of expenses and revenues – the main 
question to be answered is how to spent the money most effectively (which policies) 
on the EU level. Czech Presidency will open the debate during the spring European 
Council. Czech Republic’s position: liberal, declaring a need to lower CAP expenses. 
The position of the Czech Republic as a credible mediator is however questionable; 
there are three reasons: first, in the 2008-2009 it will turn from net beneficiary to net 
contributor and the logic of “just return” is resonating with the current government. 
Second, the problem of coalition-building, the Czech government seeks support in the 
UK, which has rather extreme position on the budget issues (rebate). Third, and most 
importantly, there is no concept or the Czech position towards CAP after 2013 
(phasing in is ending in 2013 and the Czech farmers could lobby against the 
liberalization and CAP expenses cuts). As to the EU budget revenues, the Czech 
position is rather in line with the trend to lower the VAT portion due the lack of 
transparency (many exceptions and exemptions). Czech government wants to abandon 
VAT revenue at all without offering a substitute mechanism (like the EU tax, which is 
planned by the Commission – opposition of the current Czech government).   
 
The position of Trio towards the budget reform is rather heterogeneous but the ambivalence 
of the Czech position suggests that the French and Czech positions are paradoxically closer 
than they appear at first sight.  
   
 
Jonas Eriksson gave an overview of the steps Sweden has been undertaking in relations to its 
Presidency: 
 
• Climate change – in line with long tradition of Sweden to focus on environment; the 
presumption is that the post-Kyoto deliberations will happen during the Swedish 
Presidency and energy security issues. 
 
• To increase Europe’s growth, Sweden will concentrate on the internal market, 
combining sustainable development and aspects of growth, aiming at better regulation 
and reducing the red tape, pushing ahead the Doha development agenda. Review of 
the budget is a sub-priority under this heading. It is a very real priority for Sweden 
and four historical factors come into play here: first, the agriculture - the (centre) 
parties associated with the farmers are against the CAP reform. Second, EU Structural 
and Cohesion policy – the Swedish regions are not eligible for sufficient funding and 
that plays in “just return” sense. Third, Sweden is net contributor from the very 
beginning of its membership (rebate debate) and fourth, EU scepticism is rather wide-
spread as a backlash of raising the high expectations of the EU membership (although 
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since 2006 with the new government the euroscepticism is decreasing), and the 
neutrality issue is important, too. The four factors combined lead to a strong focus on 
CAP and Swedish EU budget contribution. On current expenditure, the new 
government does not differ much from the old one (further substantial reform of CAP 
is needed, the solidarity within the Structural funds stops with the 10 CEE Member 
States).”Coherence between the policies must be secured and counteractions avoided” 
– it applies to CAP in relation to Development and Trade policies and, second, to 
Structural and Cohesion policy in relation to Lisbon Strategy – it means a complete 
phasing out of market price support and export subsidies (this position was already 
taken by Sweden when negotiating the current Financial Perspective) and serious 
reduction of the Cohesion policy in richer Member States. There is no timeframe for 
phasing out (unlike in the UK – 2020). The new government changed a tone – it wants 
“to be in an inner court of the EU”, it presents more constructive positions. Revenue 
side – need of reform per se is acknowledged, Sweden wants a system based entirely 
on GNI (traditional own resources will be kept and allowed to shrink). The EU tax – it 
is unlikely the Swedish government would consider it seriously. Rather positive 
attitude to limit the EU budget to 5 year framework.  
 
• Justice and Home Affairs – Hague programme, which will be renegotiated during 
the Swedish Presidency. Fighting cross-border organised crime and asylum and 
migration as a focus. 
 
• Environmental problem in the Baltic Sea region 
 
• Enlargement – the only issue, which unifies the political parties in Sweden, support 
to Turkish membership 
 






Overlaps of the Presidency Trio – real convergence can be expected in the energy security 
issues (including climate change and renewable resources of energy). 
 
Pro-enlargement attitude in Sweden – the high level of support towards the last Eastern 
enlargements; the reasoning behind is to stabilize the neighbourhood and democracy 
promotion. As to the Turkish membership and the cost of enlargement, there are many 
analyses (by CEPS, for example) suggesting that Turkish membership would not cost much 
and it is not seen as a difficult issue. As to the Swedish position on Kosovo independence 
(rather negative), the main issue probably is the stability of the region, which troubles 
Swedish government.      
 
Mediterranean Union (what is the idea behind) – spirit of regionalism would be involved 
(free trade area) and the issue of Turkey would be solved – two tier strategy of the French 
president in order to reflect the position of other Member States (namely Germany) and the 
possibility of attitude change of the French public in the future.   
 
